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Patricia Lindsey and Mary Bohman have provided us with an excellent overview  of
the harmonization of environmental regulations directed at primary agriculture in the context
of  trade  treaties.  Harmonization  has  a  considerable  popular  following  (Esty,  1994).
Concerns  about differences  in  environmental  regulations  were  an  important  obstacle  to
achieving a resolution  to the NAFTA negotiations and to securing passage of the relevant
legislation by the signatories.  This paper begins to de-mystify the concept of harmonization.
It raises important and as yet unresolved conceptual issues.  It identifies some lessons  from
the limited experience with the harmonization of environmental policies related to agriculture
in the context of trade treaties.
ON THE MEANING  OF HARMONIZATION
Lindsey  and  Bohman's  paper  raises  an important  question about  the meaning  of
harmonization.  They  differentiate  between  harmonization  of environmental  effects  and
harmonization of  regulatory burden.  These are not the same thing.  What does harmonization
mean?  Does  it  mean  common  outcomes,  common  policy  standards  and  instruments,
equalization  of compliance  costs,  or,  something  that  is  not  often  considered,  common
institutions?  Does harmonization mean that the form of environmental  protection policies
must  be the same or that different policies  achieve  the same function?  In the context of
pesticide regulations, harmonization has come to mean reciprocal  acceptance of  registrations
based on  equivalency  of testing procedures  and  standards.'  Lindsey  and Bohman argue
'One  limitation of this paper is its failure to analyse the process and the progress in the
harmonization of pesticide registration and the reciprocal recognition of registrations  both in the
European Community  and between Canada and the United States.  My impression is that there
has been more deliberation than actual substantive progress on this front, both in the Community
and in the North American context.  Nevertheless, the attention that this issue has received would
(continued...)"4  Proceedings
persuasively that equalization  of compliance costs of meeting environmental regulations  is
what  most  producer  and  environmental  interest  groups  seem  to  have  in  mind.  Not
surprisingly, most economists  (Bhagwati and Hudec,  1996) that have written about this issue
have taken exception to the idea that regulatory compliance  costs should be equalized across
trading  partners.  The  essence  of their  argument  is  that  the  expression  of comparative
advantage  in absorbing emissions,  driven  by resource  endowments, preferences,  standards
of living or technology,  would  be compromised  by a requirement  that all trading partners
incur  the  same  costs  in  protecting  environmental  resources.  If trading  partners  enjoy
substantially different standards  of living, as is the case with Mexico compared to the United
States  or Canada,  equalization  of water or air quality standards  could result  in the poorer
country  consuming  too  much  of a  superior  good  and  the  richer  country  too  little.  If
environmental resources  have different values  in different jurisdictions,  why impose  equal
costs for the protection of those resources?
Economists'  suggestions  have  not  had  much of an  impact  on the  development  of
environmental agreements  associated with trade treaties,  however.  And  the public choice
literature suggests  that there may be  good reasons  for ignoring  economists' musings  in this
area.  The  idea that national environmental  regulations will  be  an  accurate reflection of a
country's  comparative  advantage  in  environmental  services,  including  absorbing  waste,
makes heroic  assumptions about the ability of the political process  to discern preferences,
resource  availabilities  and  production  possibilities.  But  we  have  realized  at  least  since
Arrow's  impossibility  theorem that collective decision making is problematical.  It should,
therefore,  not be surprising  that the North American  Free Trade Agreement  (NAFTA) and
the related North American Agreement on Environmental  Cooperation (NAAEC) encourages
the recognition of equivalency of standards for protection of human and environmental safety
as  well as the  use of the most  cost effective (or least trade distorting) measures to protect
environmental  resources.  In my judgement,  the language of the NAFTA and of the NAAEC
clearly  indicates that environmental regulations are not to be used as disguised measures  to
protect  domestic  firms  from  foreign  competition.  Harmonization  of the function but not
necessarily the  form of environmental policies  seems to be encouraged.
The  third  and  usually  neglected  sense  in  which  environmental  policies  could  be
harmonized  is at a comparative  institutional  level.  For example,  common  institutions,  such
as anglo-american  common law remedies  against nuisance (see Rothbard,  1982 or Brubaker,
1995),  can be  operational  in two different  contexts and give different physical  or financial
outcomes.  Common  law remedies  are  animated by precedent  and  by actions  initiated  by
plaintiffs.  History is path dependent,  especially the history ofjudicial decisions.  A relatively
poor country with an abundant endowment of natural resources and  sparse population may
not have experienced  as many nuisance actions as a relatively wealthy and densely populated
country.  So, institutions could be harmonized but compliance  costs, environmental outcomes
and standards could  be quite different.  Harmonization  of institutions across  countries that
'(...continued)
make it a good case  study of the pitfalls but also  of the opportunities  for environmental
regulatory policy  harmonization  in an area that is of critical importance  to primary agriculture.
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follow a  common  law  tradition  that  is different  from  anglo-american  common  law  is  a
neglected  issued  within  a  neglected  issue.  If "environmental  regulation"  is  conceived
broadly as all institutions or measures that mitigate harm to water or air quality or indigenous
plants and animals within a jurisdiction, then alternative institutions can jointly and severally
support  these  aims.  Most  discussions  of  harmonization  fail  to  recognize  potential
substitutions  among  institutions,  such  as  common  law  remedies  against  trespass  and
nuisance,  quantitative restrictions  on inputs, outputs or emissions, taxes in inputs, outputs  or
emissions, the imposition of global emissions ceilings in a tradeable permits scheme or other
measures.  Harmonization  of institutions that can substitute  for one another  is much more
complex, but may be economically much more efficient, than harmonization of outcomes.
THERE ARE ENVIRONMENTAL  REGULATIONS  AND  THEN...
Much of the literature on the  harmonization of environmental  regulations  seems to
have a deeper appreciation of the categories  of market failure than it does of the  categories
of non-market or policy failure.2 A more balanced perspective would beg the question  "Are
all  'environmental  regulations'  created  equal?"  Coase  (1960,  1988)  suggests  that
environmental regulations on the part of government may be a transaction cost economising
alternative to individual negotiation or civil litigation.  But some environmental  regulations
would  seem  to  stretch  these  Coasian  limits.  An  example  of such  a  regulation  that  is
discussed in  Lindsey  and Bohman's paper  is the  requirement  that food packaging in  the
European Community meet pre-determined standards for ease of recycling.  Another current
case  involves  potential  trade  barriers  for  livestock  products  produced  with  the  aid  of
synthetic  hormones.  They also refer to human health risks  from exposure to nitrate nitrogen
in drinking water.3 The case of electric  cars in California is another example that comes to
mind.  To my eye, the "environmental"  benefits of some environmental regulations  are far
from clear.  The  NAFTA and  the NAAEC both encourage the adoption of environmental
policy measures that minimally distort trade.4 I am not aware of any accepted procedure  to
2 Wolf (1979)  has furnished a general theory of non-market failure that indicates that
regulation may end up having  effects that were not intended by its creators.  Any framework to
analyse harmonization of regulations needs  to be able to accommodate the insights of the
economic theory of regulation (i.e.,  Peltzman,  1976) and the rest of the Public Choice (Mueller,
1979) literature.
3 Giraldez and Fox indicate that the epidemiological  and toxicological  literature is
equivocal regarding human  health risks from such exposure at concentrations that exceed the 10
ppm standard by modest margins.
4 The issue of using environmental  protection as a disguised trade barrier is mentioned  at
several points in the paper.  But it is not clear to me that trade policy analysts currently are in
possession of the apparatus necessary to unmask disguises.  In 1995, Luther Tweeten told me
that the economist who can achieve this will have made his (or I would add her) career.  How do
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evaluate  policy  options  on  this basis,  but  I  am  confident  that  environmental  and  trade
economists will soon be applying  their tools to this question.
INTEGRATION  OF  GAINS  FROM  TRADE  AND  GAINS  FROM
ENVIRONMENTAL  REGULATION
The trade policy literature,  like the environmental  economics  literature,  has not yet
resolved how to compare  and ultimately to integrate,  measures of environmental  benefits
with measures  of gains  from trade.  As James Buchanan  (1969)  pointed out almost thirty
years ago,  many environmental  harms and benefits  are  not objectively  observable.  They
occur as losses  or gains in utilities and these gains and losses are subjective.  This is one of
the main reasons that the results obtained from models are ambiguous, although Lindsey and
Bohman do  not  explicitly  acknowledge  this  point  in  their review  of this literature.  We
continue  to wait  for an acceptable  process to  translate  these  subjective  magnitudes  into
objective ones.
LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE
Lindsey  and  Bohman's  discussion  of  the  admittedly  limited  track  record  of
harmonization  of  environmental  regulations  indicates  considerable  variation  in  that
experience.  There is substantial variation across actual attempts at policy harmonization on
matters  such as the timing of implementation of common standards, whether these standards
are compulsory or voluntary or applied within each country with some discretion to reflect
local environmental  problems.  Overall, their conclusion is not encouraging  to advocates of
harmonization  of environmental  regulations  among trading partners.  They point out that
neither  Canada nor the  United States have  yet achieved harmonization  of environmental
regulations directed at agriculture within their own borders.  And jurisdiction  is split between
we protect against the "New Protectionism?"  Lindsey and Bohman acknowledge that the Iron
Triangle  of environmental  lobbyists, who have often been suspicious of trade liberalization
generally,  Labour Unions seeking to protect their members  from competition from what they
perceive to be lower cost labour abroad and managers and shareholders  of firms currently
operating with the benefit of protection from  import competition can create pressure for
harmonization of environmental  regulations not for its own sake, but as a means to another  end.
Trade economists  need to  devise a framework  to help separate the  spurious arguments for
harmonization from  the legitimate ones.
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the two senior levels of government, and the specific allocation ofjurisdiction  over particular
emissions or resources  is different in each country.5
POLLUTION HAVENS
One of  the findings from the empirical literature that Lindsey and Bohman quote with
apparent approval is that differences in environmental regulations have not been an important
factor  determining  the  location  of emission  intensive  industries.  But  I  wonder if it  is
appropriate to apply that generalization to the NAFTA context.  Here we have three countries
with two significantly different levels of  economic and general institutional development that
are contiguous.  The geographic proximity of Mexico to large markets  for consumer  goods
in  the  western  United States  could  mean  that what  is  generally  true if one looks  at the
empirical literature globally may not hold in this particular instance.  And isn't the allegation
that the sum of lower wages,  land costs and less stringent  environmental regulations,  acting
in concert,  might effect the location of firms?
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